


From
Palestine
to "Xinjiang"

从
巴
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到
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从巴勒斯坦 到“新疆”： 强迫劳动和 资本统治

导语

去年10月7日以来，有许多分析都指出以色列和中国在种族灭绝和定居者殖民上互相借鉴“反恐”策略和监控技术，但甚少看到有关两者相似于强迫劳动和资本统治的讨论。实际上，巴勒斯坦人受到强迫劳动的情况无论是华语世界还是国际社会都少有人知。长期以来，以色列和欧美为首的西方世界利用哈巴拉（hasbara）和新自由主义话语掩盖其对巴勒斯坦的殖民掠夺；而今天的中俄亦通过和各威权政府结盟、树立带头抵抗西方霸权的形象来洗白自身的帝国主义行径。如此一来，“选边站”就成了常态。许多自由派一边疾呼关注维吾尔人人权，一边支持以色列种族灭绝；小粉红和坦克党（tankies）则一边高喊解放巴勒斯坦，一边视“新疆”再教育营为美帝的骗局。两者看似政治立场迥异，却都落入了两大资本主义阵营（自由民主和非自由民主）联手打造的新冷战叙事陷阱。因此，辨析资本和强迫劳动/定居者殖民的关系在当下尤为重要。只要稍作比较，我们就能发现巴勒斯坦人和维吾尔人的受压迫结构极其相似：由国家发起，受资本驱动。本文将从左翼视角分析巴勒斯坦人和维吾尔人所受强迫劳动和资本剥削的结构异同。笔者愿以拙作抛砖引玉，希冀借此打破阵营主义的迷思，呼吁跨种/民/国族无产阶级团结，联合反抗殖民、资本与极权的压迫。

Concluding Remarks

Decades of Palestinian and Uyghur suffering have taught us the isomorphism (同构性) of oppression. While the dictatorship of the CCP is vile, the incompetence and hypocrisy of bourgeois democracy is also evident in Israel, which is also guilty of genocide, as well as in its Western imperialist allies, who provide it with a protective umbrella of arms and money. At a time when Palestinians and Uyghurs are suffering genocide together, and when black prisoners are being subjected to forced labor in American prisons, we must understand that there is no meaningful difference between Chinese dictatorship capitalism and liberal democratic capitalism. Not to mention that international law is a sham on the issue of Israel and Palestine, and the double standards of human rights are disgusting: even the freedoms of speech and protest, most basic in liberal democracies, are severely eroded, and the already limited bourgeois democracy is reduced to a police state. The root cause of this similarity in oppression is none other than isomorphic capitalism.

Thus, the overthrow of dictatorships and the achievement of national/ethnic self-determination are essential, but not sufficient, for anti-colonial politics. In colonies where the interests of capitalists and settlers are intertwined, the colonized “race”/ethnic group is almost universally proletarianized. Even after decolonization is completed, the indigenous people still have to deal with foreign capital, which is always on the prowl. With the globalization of capital, it is difficult to develop an indigenous economy without opening up markets. Therefore, even after the abolition of apartheid and the advent of bourgeois democracy, the existing or new indigenous/ethnic bourgeoisie will inevitably embrace foreign capital and continue to exploit their proletarian compatriots — just as in the United States and South Africa today. In other words, even if military occupation and settler colonization are eliminated, capital will be able to reorganize itself and carry out economic colonization. At that time, capital may not be “Chinese” or “Israeli”, but it will always be capitalist. Therefore, we must recognize the material reality of a racially/ethnically divided proletariat and uproot the capitalist system that reproduces colonial structures. At the same time, we must avoid repeating the mistakes of the CCP’s phony institutions of “national autonomy” and build a genuine socialist democracy based on the principle of genuine national/ethnic self-determination. Only then can we put an end to racial/ethnic oppression and achieve freedom and equality, leading to the liberation of all.

结语

巴勒斯坦人和维吾尔人数十年的苦难让我们深悟压迫的同构性。中共独裁固然万恶，但资产阶级民主的无能和虚伪也尽显于同样犯下种族灭绝之罪的以色列、及为其输送炮弹金钱撑起保护伞的西方帝国主义盟友。在巴勒斯坦人和维吾尔人同被种族灭绝的此时此刻，在美国监狱里的黑人囚犯同受强迫劳动的此时此刻，我们必须明白：中共独裁资本主义和自由民主资本主义在本质上毫无差别。何况巴以问题上国际法形同虚设，人权双标令人作呕，就连自由民主国家最基本的言论自由和抗议自由都严重受蚀，有限的资产阶级民主沦为警察国家。压迫如此相似的根源不是别的，正是同构的资本主义。

因此，对于反殖民而言，推翻独裁和民族自决必不可少，但也远远不够。在资本家和定居者利益盘根错节的殖民地，被殖民种/民族几乎已全民被无产化。哪怕完成去殖民，原住民仍要面对虎视眈眈的外来资本。在资本全球化的今天，想要发展本土经济很难不打开市场。因此即便废除了种族隔离、有了资产阶级民主，原有或新兴的本种/民族资产阶级也必然会和异族/外来资本联手，继续剥削同族的无产阶级——正如今天的美国和南非一样。换言之，哪怕军事占领和定居者殖民被消灭了，资本还能变形重组，进行经济殖民。到时资本未必姓“中”姓“以”，但永远姓“资”。因此，我们必须认清分化种/民族无产阶级的物质现实，从根本上推翻再生产殖民结构的资本主义。同时我们亦须避免重蹈中共伪民族自治之覆辙，在真民族自决的原则上建立真正的社会主义民主。唯有如此，我们才可能终结种/民族压迫，实现自由平等，通往所有人的解放。

From Palestine to "Xinjiang": Forced Labor and Capitalist rule

Canyu

Since October 7th of last year, many analyses have pointed out that Israel and China have borrowed “counter-terrorism” tactics and surveillance techniques from each other in the context of genocide and settler colonization, but there has been little discussion of the similarities between the two in terms of forced labor and the rule of capital. Indeed, the forced labor of Palestinians is little known in the Chinese-speaking world or internationally. For a long time, Israel and the West, led by Europe and the United States, have used hasbara and neoliberal discourses to hide their colonial plunder of Palestine, while today China and Russia are also whitewashing their own imperialist practices by aligning themselves with authoritarian governments and projecting an image of leading resistance to Western hegemony. In this way, “choosing sides” has become the norm. Many liberals call for Uyghur human rights but support Israel’s genocide, while “little pinks” (小粉红 i.e. young cyber-nationalists) and “tankies” clamor for the liberation of Palestine but dismiss the labor camps in “Xinjiang” as a hoax concocted by US imperialism. While they seem to have very different political stances, both have fallen into the trap of the new Cold War narrative created together by the two capitalist blocs of liberal and illiberal “democracy.” Thus, discerning the relationship between capital and forced labor/settler colonization is particularly important at the present time. With a little comparison, we can see that the structures of oppression for Palestinians and Uyghurs are extremely similar: state-initiated and capital-driven. This article will analyze the structural similarities and differences between forced labor and capital exploitation of Palestinians and Uyghurs from a left-wing perspective. The author hopes to dispel the myth of campism and call for inter-racial/-ethnic/-national proletarian solidarity against the oppression of colonization, capital and totalitarianism.

集中营/监狱里的强迫劳动

巴勒斯坦历史学家萨尔曼·阿布·西塔（Salman Abu Sitta）的研究发现，早在1948至1955年，犹太复国主义者就在种族清洗巴勒斯坦人的同时建立了至少22座集中营，关押了约7,000名巴勒斯坦人。西塔指出，犹太复国主义者想建立一个犹太人统治的政权，因此一开始将巴勒斯坦平民视作负担，只是计划将其赶出家园，而非关押。但以色列宣布建国引起叙利亚等周边阿拉伯国家广泛不满。这些国家派军进入巴勒斯坦领地与以交战。自那以后，以色列开始兴建集中营，用来关押战俘。另一方面，鉴于数万犹太人被征兵入伍，以色列亟需填补劳动力缺口。因此在关押战俘的同时，以色列也开始有意将大量巴勒斯坦平民当作“战俘”关押（在此之前以关押的巴勒斯坦战俘并不多），并将其强制征用为殖民经济服务。在集中营里，巴勒斯坦囚犯被迫充当佣人、弄干湿地。除了公共服务，他们甚至还被迫参与针对巴勒斯坦人的军事劳动——运送巴勒斯坦民居被毁后的残骸、收集运输同胞遭受洗劫的财物、挖战壕、掩埋死者等。讽刺的是，犹太人启用这些集中营距离德国关闭关押犹太人的集中营只过了三年；运营这些集中营的人中，恰恰还有曾被纳粹关押过的犹太人。

除了集中营，以色列监狱也是巴勒斯坦政治犯强迫劳动的血泪之地。据Addameer报告显示，自1967年至1972年，以色列关押的巴勒斯坦囚犯被迫为以色列生产坦克等军事设备——自然是被用于镇压屠杀巴勒斯坦人——以及被“雇佣”来建设关押巴勒斯坦自己人的监狱。[4]《犹太复国主义秘史》的作者罗尔夫·熊曼称，政治化的监狱劳动就是“骚扰囚犯生活”的强迫劳动，旨在“最大化肉体和心理的压力”。[5]在强迫劳动期间，巴勒斯坦囚犯遭受了非人虐待和酷刑。拒绝劳动则会遭到惩罚：包括被剥夺现金券、放风时间、书籍报纸，甚至是被隔离和殴打。这些劳动的平均工资仅仅只有每小时0.05美元（相当于0.3 - 0.4元人民币）。

Addameer的报告还指出，尽管在1972年，巴勒斯坦囚犯通过绝食迫使以色列废除了监狱强迫劳动制度，但“强迫劳动”仍以另一种更为隐蔽的方式继续——监狱商店制（canteen system）。一开始，巴勒斯坦囚犯的一些基本食物和日用品由国际红十字会免费提供。但自1970年代起，它被监狱商店制取而代之。随着狱方基本供给（hasbaka）的数量和种类减少、监狱餐质量下滑，巴勒斯坦囚犯不得不依赖于监狱商店，并在监狱劳动体制下通过所谓“自愿式”工作换取积分（canteen credits），购买必需品。这种对巴勒斯坦囚工的剥削直到1980年才逐步消失，但监狱商店制却一直延续至今。而经济剥削则很大程度从囚犯转移到了家属身上：因为监狱外的人需要赚钱转给监狱里的人用。

market. (Here it should be noted that the largest influx of Han settlers into “Xinjiang” in the first three decades of the CCP’s rule was not organized by the Corps, but consisted of over 2 million people who were fleeing the [Great Leap] Famine [1959-1961].

Add to this the fact that the racially/ethnically segregated labor market was already favorable to Jewish/Han workers. It can be seen that both Israeli and Han settlers, for the most part, were promised upward mobility and relatively favorable economic conditions by the colonial system. In their article “Xinjiang, Capital, and Ethnic Oppression,” Yu Zhou also compares Han settlers in the region to W.E.B. Du Bois’s White Americans. Yu Zhou acutely pointed out that in addition to economic benefits, Han immigrants also received “spiritual rewards” from ethnic oppression: social respect. Similarly, even the lowest stratum of Jewish Israeli enjoys “the civil and human rights, the land, the home, the social benefits of which the Palestinians are denied.” Under racial/ethnic segregation, racial/ethnic identity itself is a great privilege. Personal morality aside, why would proletarian settlers reject a system that has all the advantages and none of the disadvantages for them? It’s as hard as asking the privileged cis straight male to oppose the patriarchy. No wonder the Israeli socialists Moshe Machover and Akiva Orr say that it is material reality that prevents proletarian class solidarity between Palestinians and Jewish Israelis. Nor was this an isolated case. According to a 2011 opinion poll by UighurBiz, “The vast majority of Han interviewees support a hardline policy toward Uyghurs. 89.4 percent of the Han interviewees in Xinjiang wanted to maintain and strengthen Han dominance at all levels. 82.3 percent of the Han with hukou [household registration] based in Xinjiang supported the continuation of exclusive control.” Data is the best evidence.

In a more sinister type of social division, the colonial ruling class also cooperates with some of the colonized people, making partial concessions and incorporating them as agents to discipline their compatriots. The most notorious example is the Palestinian Authority, a puppet regime that helps Israel suppress the Palestinian people. Also, Palestinian middlemen in the labor market are part of the system of oppression. Vickery points out that Palestinian workers in the West Bank rely heavily on intermediaries of the same ethnicity in order to obtain work permits. These intermediaries are mostly Hebrew-speaking Palestinians from higher social strata. They are well-connected and able to better communicate with Israeli employers. However, instead of fighting for the legal rights of Palestinian workers, they often become accomplices of Israeli capitalists in their quest for profit, helping them to leverage legal loopholes, and exploiting and even abusing their fellow workers. In “Xinjiang”, the Han ruling class has also integrated some ethnic minorities into the state apparatus. For example, in re-education camps there are Uyghur and Kazakh guards who watch over their compatriots. According to Uyghur activists Tahir Imin and Dilxat Raxit, such individuals can be broadly categorized into three groups: (1) “typical degenerate ethnic traitors”; (2) those who have no choice but to do so for their own safety and that of their families; and (3) those who are unable to find good jobs. They were all promised some reward by the colonial rulers: either means of subsistence or personal freedom. But in any case, they were victims of inhuman forced labor, perpetual “two-faced people” (两面人)—and it seems likely that this is where much of the so-called “degeneration” comes from.

Machover) 和阿基瓦·奥尔 (Akiva Orr) 会说, 正是物质现实阻碍了犹太人和巴勒斯坦人之间的 (无产) 阶级团结。这一解释同样适用于汉人和维吾尔人。王力雄曾观察到: “新疆汉人总是自觉不自觉地把自己摆在镇压者的位置。就连兵团那些从内地农村招的农工, 平时受尽贪官欺压, 一旦需要镇压当地民族时也会摩拳擦掌地请战。”[64] 这些汉人并非个例。据维吾尔在线在2011年做的一次维汉民意调查显示: “绝大多数汉人支持对维吾尔族的强硬政策。89.4% 的新疆汉人希望在各个层面保持并强化汉族人的优势地位。82.3% 的新疆户籍汉人支持继续保持排他性的权力控制。”数据就是最好的证明。

更邪恶的分化是, 殖民统治阶级还会与部分被殖民者合作, 做出部分让利, 将其收编为规训同族人的代理人。最臭名昭著的便是帮以色列镇压巴勒斯坦人民的傀儡政权——巴勒斯坦权力机构。另外, 劳动力市场上的巴勒斯坦中间人也是压迫系统的一环。维克里指出, 要想获得工作证, 西岸的巴勒斯坦工人很大程度要仰赖同族中间人。这些中间人大多是会说希伯来语、社会阶层更高的巴勒斯坦人。中间人人脉广阔, 能更好和以色列雇主沟通。但是, 他们往往不会为巴勒斯坦工人争取合法权利, 反而会为了逐利成为以色列资本家的帮凶, 想方设法帮其钻法律漏洞, 剥削甚至虐待同族工人。在“新疆”, 汉人统治阶级亦把一些少数民族收编入国家机器。例如再教育营里就有维吾尔、哈萨克看守看管自己同胞。根据维吾尔族活动人士塔依尔·衣明 (Tahir Imin) 和迪里夏提·热西提 (Dilxat Raxit) 的解释, 这些人大致可分为三类: 1) “典型的堕落的民族叛徒”; 2) 为了自己和家人安全不得已这么做的; 3) 因为找不到好工作的。[66] 他们都被殖民统治者许诺了一定酬报: 或是谋生手段, 或是人身自由。但无论如何, 他们都是非人的强迫劳动的受害者, 永远的“两面人”。而所谓“堕落”恐怕很大程度也由此而来。



Forced labor in concentration camps/prisons

Research by Palestinian historian Salman Abu Sitta found that as early as 1948-1955, the Zionists established at least 22 concentration camps alongside the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians, imprisoning some 7,000 Palestinians. Sitta notes that the Zionists wanted to establish a Jewish-ruled regime, and therefore initially viewed Palestinian civilians as a burden, planning to remove them from their homes but not to imprison them. However, Israel's declaration of statehood caused widespread discontent in neighboring Arab countries such as Syria. These countries sent troops into Palestinian territory to fight Israel. At that point, Israel began to build concentration camps for holding prisoners of war. On the other hand, there was an urgent need to fill the labor gap as tens of thousands of Jews were drafted into the army. So along with the POWs, Israel also began to intentionally hold large numbers of Palestinian civilians as “POWs” (there were not many Palestinian POWs held by Israel before then) and forcibly requisition them for the colonial economy. In the camps, Palestinian prisoners were forced to work as domestic servants and laborers on wetland reclamation projects. In addition to public service, Palestinian prisoners were even forced to participate in military labor against their own people—transporting the wreckage of destroyed Palestinian homes, collecting and transporting the looted belongings of their compatriots, digging trenches, and burying the dead. Ironically, the Jews inaugurated these camps only three years after Germany closed the camps where Jews were held; the people who operated these camps also happened to include Jews who had been imprisoned by the Nazis.

In addition to the concentration camps, Israeli prisons have been a bloody site of forced labor for Palestinian political prisoners. According to a report by the Addameer Association, from 1967 to 1972, Palestinian prisoners held by Israel were forced to produce military equipment such as tanks for Israel—naturally used in the repression and massacre of Palestinians—and “hired” to build prisons for their own people. According to Ralph Schoenman, author of *The Hidden History of Zionism*, politicized prison labor is forced labor that “disturbs the lives of the prisoners” and is designed to “maximize physical and psychological stress.” During forced labor, Palestinian prisoners were subjected to dehumanizing abuse and torture. Refusal to work was punished by the withholding of cash vouchers, of time off from work, and of books and newspapers, along with punishment by isolation and beatings. The average wage for this labor was a mere \$0.05 per hour (equivalent to 0.3-0.4 Chinese yuan).

The Addameer report also notes that although Palestinian prisoners forced Israel to abolish the explicit forced labor system in prisons through a hunger strike in 1972, compulsory work continued in another, more insidious form—the prison canteen system. At first, some basic food and supplies for Palestinian prisoners were provided free of charge by the International Red Cross. In the 1970s, however, this was replaced by the canteen system. As the quantity and variety of basic provisions (hasbaka) decreased and the quality of meals declined, Palestinian prisoners were forced to rely on the commissary and to perform “voluntary” work in exchange for canteen credits to purchase necessities. This exploitation of Palestinian prisoners' labor was gradually phased out after 1980, but the commissary system continues to this day, with economic exploitation being transferred from the prisoners to their families: those outside the prison need to earn

在“新疆”，早在毛泽东时代就有了再教育营的前身——劳改营。当时的劳改营和今天的再教育营不一样：前者并非只针对少数民族，而是所有民族中的异见者。但不可否认的是，在少数民族地区，少数民族人士受劳改的真实原因与其追求民族自决/独立的关系更大，而非一般意义上对中共官僚社会主义路线的挑战——这也是少数民族劳改犯与汉人劳改犯的不同之处。蒙古族学者杨海英指出，在“反右”运动中，一大批维吾尔干部由于“历史上曾追求‘民族自决’”，而被冠上“排斥汉族，破坏民族团结”的罪名。根据中共官方记载，当时“新疆”有1612人被划分为“右派地方民族主义分子”。尽管现有资料甚少披露这些人是否均接受劳教式的强迫劳动，但我们大可根据中共对被打成“右派”的官员哈木提·尧鲁达西甫判处“下放劳动锻炼”的标准，来做出肯定推断。[8]类似的事情也在文革期间上演。例如，“新疆”鞑靼穆斯林苏云古丽·查尼舍夫（Söyüngül Chanisheff）因在60年代末参与组建东突厥斯坦人民革命党，被判劳改三年。虽然劳教制在实行近56年后于2013年从法律上被废除，强迫劳动并未断绝，无论是在“新疆”还是中国内地。但与内地最不同的是，“新疆”的强迫劳动始终带有（内）殖民性质。

2014年后，“新疆”的强迫劳动制开始与“反恐人民战争”叙事结合，高度民族化，演变为再教育营系统。据统计，再教育营里关押的突厥穆斯林至少有150万人。与再教育营建设同步的是“新疆”纺织服装产业的发展。2014年，“新疆”加速推进纺织服装业发展，吸引东部沿海地区该产业转移，预计提供100万就业机会。自2017至2018年“再教育营”扩大化以来，中国政府将其更名为“职业技能教育培训中心”（亦即再教育营），并将其作为当地的经济载体，为内地企业来“疆”建厂提供补贴。这些附属工厂建在再教育营内或附近，成为了再教育营系统的延伸。许多维吾尔人在营中完成“再教育”后便被直接转移至工厂。2018年，仅在“喀什”地区就有10万被拘者被转移至工业园工作。然而，从再教育营到附属工厂并不意味着自由，而是严酷剥削。据学者达伦·拜勒（Darren Byler）采访一位被转移到工厂的被拘留者得知：她的实习工资仅为每月600元（国家最低工资的三分之一），还会被各种克扣，且不许离开工厂，时刻受到监控。用她的话说：“就像奴隶制一样”。



a large number of factories and enterprises in Ghulja (so-called “Yining”) “closed down” and sacked many Uyghur workers on the grounds of “bankruptcy,” “lack of demand,” and so on. At the same time, however, most of these factories (or factory plots) were sold to Han settlers, and Han workers ended up with better conditions than their Uyghur counterparts. In the case of the Construction Bureau of Ili Prefecture, for example, “there were more than 1,000 employees, 90 percent of whom were Uyghurs. The Uyghur employees’ jobs were eliminated through the process of privatization after the incident. The owner who contracted the enterprise brought more than 10,000 Han workers from China proper in order to complete the projects that he had taken over from corrupt officials. These workers now work in Ghulja and the surrounding areas. None of the Uyghurs, who were willing to take even the worst jobs to support their families, have been hired back.” The reasons for the dismissal of the Uyghur workers and the recruitment of Han workers to replace them can be easily imagined.

On the other hand, the polarization of the Uyghur proletariat is brutally hidden in the re-education camps and their satellite factories. As Byler reveals, while there is severe repression in both places, conditions in the satellite factories are relatively better (e.g., there is less security surveillance, and workers still have some degree of freedom of movement). Uyghur workers in the factories have thus become active labor army. The large number of detainees in the re-education camps serve as a reserve labor army. Thus, factory workers needed to prove that they were industrial workers who had “truly completed their re-education” through absolute obedience. For both capitalists and workers knew that “any complaints, any slowdown in production, could result in their [the workers’] replacement with other detainees.”

One might wonder if there is a possibility of interracial/-ethnic class struggle since Jewish/Han workers and Palestinian/Uyghur workers are all oppressed by the same ruling class. But experience tells us this would be very difficult. Historically, British and Irish workers, and white and black workers in the US and South Africa, have been in hostile camps. This is because the bourgeoisie not only divides the colonially racialized/ethnicized proletariat from within, but also divides the proletariat of the colonizing and colonized “races”/ethnic groups. There is a “you versus me” precisely because the exploitation of the “you” favors the “me”.

In the West Bank, for example, nearly two-thirds of Israeli settlers (overwhelmingly Jewish) come to “improve their quality of life” via low housing prices and high subsidies. According to statistics, the average house price in Tel Aviv in 2013 was \$600,000, while the average house price in Ariel (the 4th largest settlement city in the West Bank) was less than half of that!⁶⁴ Due to the low housing prices in West Bank settlements, even many Israeli Palestinians have come to buy homes here.⁶⁵ Teachers who come to work in the settlements also receive a 20% salary increase, and government subsidies cover 80% of housing rent and 75% of travel expenses.⁶⁶ The same is true in “Xinjiang”. For example, the government subsidizes businesses to encourage their entry into the region. In recent years, the Corps has also encouraged Han proletarians to relocate to “Xinjiang” by providing new immigrants with housing, jobs, and land. These policies are often aimed at college graduates looking for jobs, migrant workers, the unemployed, and laborers who have been lifted out of poverty — “surplus labor-power” excluded from the competitive national/urban labor

中接过的工程从内地带来了10000多汉族工人。这些工人现在工作在伊宁市与周边的地区。想干些哪怕是脏活累活而养家糊口的维吾尔人一个也没有被这个建设局录用。”解聘维吾尔工人又新招汉族工人，其缘由可想而知。

另一方面，对维吾尔无产阶级的分化则残酷地隐藏于再教育营和其附属工厂。诚如拜勒揭露，虽然两处都有严酷压迫，但附属工厂条件相对较好（如安保监控较少、工人仍有一定程度活动自由）。工厂里的维吾尔工人也因而成了现役劳动军；再教育营里的大量被拘留者则是产业后备军。因此，工厂工人需要通过绝对服从来证明自己是“真正完成了再教育”的产业工人。因为资本家和工人都心知肚明：“任和抱怨，任何生产的放缓，都会导致ta们【工人】被其ta【再教育营里的】被拘留者替代。”

有人可能会想，既然犹太/汉族工人、巴勒斯坦/维吾尔工人都受到统治阶级压迫，那是否有跨种/民族阶级斗争的可能性呢？但现实告诉我们这很难。历史上，英国工人和爱尔兰工人、美国和南非的白人工人和黑人，都是敌对阵营。这是因为资产阶级不仅从内部分化了被殖民种/民族无产阶级，还分化了殖民种/民族和被殖民种/民族的无产阶级——之所以有“你我”之分正是因为剥削“你”有利于“我”。

例如在西岸，有近2/3的以色列定居者（绝大多为犹太人）是冲着“改善生活质量”来的：低房价和高补贴。据统计，2013年特拉维夫的平均房价为60万美金，而当时阿里埃勒（西岸第4大定居点城市）的平均房价连这一半还不到。由于西岸定居点房价之低，就连许多以色列籍巴勒斯坦人都来这里购房。来定居点工作的老师也会有20%的涨薪，政府补贴还会覆盖80%的住房租金和75%的差旅费。在“新疆”也是如此。例如政府给企业补贴，鼓励入“疆”。近年来，兵团也为鼓励汉人移民“新疆”，为新汉人移民提供房屋、工作和土地。这些政策往往面向待业的大学毕业生、农民工、失业人士、脱贫劳动力[59]——被竞争激烈的本国/城市劳动力市场排除在外的剩余劳动力（要知道，中共建政头三十年最大的汉人入“疆”潮不是兵团人，而是大饥荒时期高达200多万的内地逃荒饥民）。再加上种/民族隔离的劳动力市场本就对犹太工人/汉族工人有利。可见，无论是以色列定居者还是汉人定居者，大多都被殖民制许诺了向上流动和相对优越的经济条件。另一方面，在《新疆、资本与民族压迫》一文中，雨舟还把汉人类比作W·E·B·杜波依斯笔下的美国白人。雨舟敏锐指出，除了经济利益，汉族移民还从民族压迫中获得了“精神上的报酬”：社会尊重。同样，哪怕是最底层的以色列犹太人，都能享有“巴勒斯坦人被剥夺的公民权利与人权、土地、家、社会福利”。在种/民族隔离制下，种/民族身份本身就是一种巨大的特权。抛开个人道德不谈，无产阶级定居者为何要拒绝对自己有百利而无一弊的制度呢？这就像要占尽特权的顺直男反对父权制一样难。难怪以色列的社会主义者摩西·马霍弗（Moshe

money in order to fund expenses of those on the inside.

In “Xinjiang”, as early as the Mao era there were “reform-through-labor (laogai) camps (劳改营)—the predecessors of today’s “re-education camps” (再教育营). The former differed in that they were not intended for ethnic minorities only, but for dissidents of all ethnic groups. It is undeniable, however, that the real reason ethnic minorities were subjected to such camps in minority areas had more to do with their quest for national self-determination/independence than a challenge to the CCP’s bureaucratic socialist line in a general sense—this is what distinguished the minority camps from those targeting Han Chinese populations. Mongolian scholar Yang Haiying points out that during the Anti-Rightist campaign, a large number of Uyghur cadres were labeled as “rejecting the Han and sabotaging national solidarity” because of their “historical pursuit of ‘national self-determination’”. According to official CCP records, 1,612 people were classified as “rightist local nationalists” in “Xinjiang” at the time. Although there is little information available about whether all of these individuals were subjected to forced labor along the lines of “re-education-through-labor”, this seems likely considering the criteria used to sentence Hamuti Yaoludaxifu (an official who had been labeled as a “rightist”) to be “sent down for training through labor (laodong duanlian)” (下放劳动锻炼). Similar sentences were assigned during the Cultural Revolution. For example, Söyüngül Chanisheff, a Tatar Muslim from “Xinjiang,” was sentenced to three years of “reform through labor” (laogai) for her involvement in the formation of the East Turkestan People’s Revolutionary Party in the late 1960s. Although the system of “re-education through labor” (laojiao 劳教) was officially abolished in 2013 after nearly 56 years, forced labor has not ceased, either in “Xinjiang” or in China proper (内地). In contrast with the forced labor system in China proper, however, the one in “Xinjiang” has always been characterized by (internal) colonialism.

After 2014, the system of forced labor in “Xinjiang” began to be highly “ethnicized” (民族化) and evolve into a system of re-education camps in conjunction with the narrative of the “People’s War on Terror”. According to statistics, at least 1.5 million Turkic Muslims were imprisoned in re-education camps [as of 2019]. In parallel with the construction of re-education camps was the development of the textile and garment industry in “Xinjiang,” which accelerated in 2014 to attract industrial transfer from the eastern seaboard and was expected to provide one million jobs. With the expansion of “re-education camps” in 2017-2018, the government renamed them “vocational skills education and training centers”, and has been using them as a local economic vehicle for subsidizing companies from China proper to open factories in “Xinjiang.” These affiliated factories were built in or near the re-education camps, becoming an extension of the camp system. Many Uyghurs have been transferred directly to the factories after completing their “re-education” period. In 2018, 100,000 detainees were transferred to industrial parks in the Kashgar region alone. However, the move from re-education camps to affiliated factories does not mean freedom, but rather harsh exploitation. According to the anthropologist Darren Byler, who interviewed one of the detainees transferred to a factory, her “internship” salary was only 600 yuan per month (one third of the national minimum wage), with various deductions, and she was not allowed to leave the factory, being kept under constant surveillance. In her words, “It was like slavery.”

无论是巴勒斯坦人还是维吾尔人，强迫劳动在监狱/集中营外同样存在。许多受害者是最易受剥削的底层：农民。在《雇用敌人：以色列定居点的巴勒斯坦工人故事》一书中，马修·维克里（Matthew Vickery）指出，有许多生活在约旦河西岸接缝区（seam zone）的巴勒斯坦农民由于被以色列逐步剥夺耕地，又因移动受限、本土经济受钳，最终不得不到以色列定居点从事低端工作。这些工作往往是建筑工、长工、售货员：超负荷劳动、收入低于最低工资、无偿加班、没有社会保障……巴勒斯坦女工的处境比男性同胞还要艰难：工资相较同族男工更低，承担更多再生产劳动，甚至承受着以色列雇主的性骚扰。尽管巴勒斯坦农民工不像被囚工一样直接受到胁迫，但这种看似“自愿选择”的剥削被维克里称为更隐蔽的国家发起式强迫劳动（state-instigated forced labor）——因为别无选择。

在改革开放后的“新疆”，维吾尔农民被剥削的结构也极其相似。对于维吾尔农民来说，市场化和城镇化带来的土地剥夺极大程度加剧了维吾尔农民的赤贫状态。加上语言文化迥异、宗教习俗不同、民族歧视严重、自由移动受限等因素，大多数维吾尔农民为了谋生，要么只能在“疆”内“自发”迁移（当农奴或是进入非农业的低端行业），要么只能接受政府强制性的劳动力转移。无论哪种，ta们都不得不面对极度的剥削和压迫：民族歧视、社会隔离、待遇极低、缺乏保障、失去权利……因此，ta们都是维克里所说的国家发起式强迫劳动的受害者。在这一部分，笔者将着重比较以色列占领西岸后的西岸巴勒斯坦农民及改革开放后的维吾尔农民，呈现两者在集中营外所受强迫劳动的结构异同。

（一）对原住民土地的占有和剥夺

强迫劳动往往伴随着对原住民进行土地剥夺。这对农民来讲是致命的，因为土地是其赖以生存的生产资料。

对于接缝区的巴勒斯坦农民，维克里以一座名为阿尔瓦拉加（Al-Walaja）的村庄为例，详细揭露了以色列殖民者如何步步蚕食其土地。在1948年巴勒斯坦大浩劫（Nakba）后，该村庄的村民被迫逃离原地。Ta们当时以为战争很快就会结束，因此便暂迁至村庄附近，开垦耕地，伺机重返家园。然而1967年六日战争之后，以色列迅速吞并了西岸。它在该村及其周边地区建立起了前哨站、给定居者居住的房屋、联通本国的公路网络。再到了2002年第二次巴勒斯坦大起义后，隔离墙更是将该村庄并入以色列直接控制的西岸C区。就连村民们新建的村庄及新开发的耕地都被以色列以“保育土地”为名纳

Division and Conquest to Break Resistance

Forced labor and economic subjugation have not only provided a constant source of fuel for colonial capital accumulation, but have also divided the colonized and undermined collective resistance. In both Palestine and “Xinjiang,” the large population of unemployed people constitute what Marx called an “industrial reserve army” — a reservoir of cheap labor-power. In the case of Israel, this reservoir includes not only unemployed Palestinians, but also migrant workers from other countries. In order to earn a living and support their families, indigenous proletarians had to enter the secondary labor market planned by the colonizers essentially as serfs or slaves, even though it was highly exploitative. Once employed, they joined the active labor force in opposition to the industrial reserve army, in constant fear of losing their jobs. Both they and the capitalists knew that there were many unemployed people who desperately needed the job. Thus, on the one hand, colonial capitalists are free to rip off the employed indigenous workers, while on the other hand, the workers are forced to accept the rip-off for fear of being replaced. In this way, the confrontation between the colonizers/bourgeoisie and the colonized/proletariat is transformed into a confrontation between the active labor force and the industrial reserve army — that is, a confrontation within the colonized proletariat. Under these circumstances, any resistance, whether from the workers themselves or their fellow Palestinians/Uyghurs, will make it difficult for them to keep their jobs.

For example, Palestinian workers in Gaza and the West Bank who have tried to unionize or sue their employers have been at high risk of losing their jobs, and have even been blacklisted from ever working in Israel again. And the collective punishment of ethnic resistance is most evident in today’s genocidal war. Thousands of Palestinian workers have been forcibly repatriated to Gaza since the war broke out on October 7th of last year. Up to 200,000 Palestinian construction workers have been barred from traveling to work in settlements in the West Bank. Even Palestinians who remain in Gaza and non-settlement portions of the West Bank to work have not been spared: some 400,000 Palestinians have lost their jobs as a result of the war.⁵⁶ In addition, Israel has withheld up to \$78 million of monthly tax revenues from the Palestinian Authority, making it impossible to pay public employees.. In the face of labor shortages created by collective punishment, Israel makes up for them through the importation of migrant workers from other countries. According to statistics, [last year] 10,000 Indian workers [were expected to] come to Israel to fill labor gaps in the Israeli construction industry.⁵⁸ The reason why Indian workers are willing to take the risk of going to Israel is precisely because of the current severe employment crisis in India. In fact, since the first Palestinian Intifada, Israel has been importing migrant workers from other countries, including China, to replace Palestinian construction workers — with no guarantees of basic rights. All of this is done to protect Israel’s “national security” and to prevent Palestinian workers from taking advantage of Israel’s dependence on their labor to form an effective movement against apartheid — as black workers once did in South Africa.

This collective punishment of resistance also applies to Uyghur workers. According to Mehmet Emin Hazret, after the 1997 “Yining Incident” of February 5th in 1997,

强迫劳动和经济宰制不仅为殖民资本积累提供了源源不断的燃料，还分化了被殖民者，瓦解了联合反抗。无论是在巴勒斯坦还是“新疆”，大量的原住民失业人口都构成了马克思所说的产业后备军——廉价的劳动力蓄水池。对于以色列来说，这个蓄水池里不仅有无业的原住民，还包括外国移工。为了谋生养家，原住民无产者不得不进入殖民者规划好的次级劳动力市场充当农奴或奴工，即便这里充满剥削。一旦就业，ta们便加入了和产业后备军形成对立的现役劳动军，无时无刻不害怕丢工作。因为ta们和资本家都深知还有很多失业者迫切需要这份工作。因此，一方面殖民资本家可以随意宰割原住民就业工人，另一方面工人害怕被取代而不得不接受宰割。如此一来，殖民者/资产阶级和被殖民者/无产阶级的对抗，也就被转化为现役劳动军和产业后备军之间的对抗——亦即被殖民者/无产阶级内部的对抗。在这种情况下，任何反抗都会令工人饭碗难保，无论这反抗是来自工人自己还是其同族。

例如，加沙和西岸的巴勒斯坦工人无论试图建工会还是状告雇主，都极可能丢掉工作，甚至还会被加入黑名单，再也无法赴以务工。而同族反抗招致的集体惩罚在如今的以色列种族灭绝战争中最为显然。自去年10月7日战争爆发后，数千巴勒斯坦工人强行被遣返回加沙。高达20万巴勒斯坦建筑工人被禁止赴以及西岸定居点务工。即便是留在加沙和西岸（非定居点）工作的巴勒斯坦人也无法幸免：约40万巴勒斯坦人因为战争失去了工作。[47]此外，以色列还扣押了高达7800万美金的巴勒斯坦权力机构月度税收，令其无法给公职人员发工资。对于集体惩罚产生的劳动力短缺，以色列又会用外国移工来填补。据统计，10,000名印度工人将陆续赴以务工，填补以色列建筑业的劳动力空缺。而印度工人之所以愿意冒着风险赴以恰恰又是因为印度目前严重的就业危机。事实上，自巴勒斯坦第一次大起义后，以色列就开始雇用中国工人在内的外国移工来取代巴勒斯坦建筑工——中国工人的人权状况也没有保障。[50]这些都是为了保护以色列的“国家安全”，避免巴勒斯坦工人像曾经南非的黑人工人一样，利用劳动力的过度依赖形成反抗种族隔离的势力。

这种对反抗的集体惩罚同样体现在维吾尔工人身上。据买买提明·艾孜来提（Mehmet Emin Hazret）统计，在1997年的“伊宁二五事件”后，伊宁大量工厂和企业以“破产”、“没有需求”等理由“倒闭”，解雇了大批维吾尔工人。但与此同时，这些工厂（或工厂地皮）大多被卖给了汉人，汉人工人也比维吾尔工人得到更好安顿。以伊犁州建设局为例：“有员工1000多名，其中90%为维吾尔族。1997年‘2.5事件’以后以私有化的借口取消了维吾尔族员工的工作。承包该企业的老板为了完成从那些汉族贪官手

Forced labor exists outside of the prisons/camps as well, whether for Palestinians or for Uyghurs. Many of the victims come from the most vulnerable segment of society: nongmin (农民)—ruralites, “peasants”, or people from rural areas. In *Employing the Enemy: The Story of Palestinian Labourers on Israeli Settlements*, Matthew Vickery points out that there are many rural Palestinians living in the “Seam Zone” of the West Bank who, due to Israel’s gradual expropriation of their farmland, as well as restrictions on movement and a clampdown on the local economy, end up having to migrate to Israeli settlements to work in the bottom tier of the labor market. These jobs are often as construction workers, agricultural laborers, or salesclerks: overworked, earning less than the minimum wage, required to work unpaid overtime, and lacking social security. Palestinian women workers are in an even more difficult situation than their male counterparts, with even lower wages, more reproductive labor, and often facing sexual harassment by their Israeli employers. Although Palestinian migrant workers are not directly coerced like their incarcerated counterparts, Vickery describes this seemingly “voluntary choice” of exploitation as a more insidious form of “state-instigated forced labor”—because there is no other choice.

In “Xinjiang” since the “Reform and Opening” [a set of state policies launched in 1978, corresponding to a key phase of China’s capitalist transition], the structure of exploitation of rural Uyghurs has been extremely similar. For Uyghurs from rural areas, land dispossession brought about by marketization and urbanization has greatly exacerbated their extreme poverty. Combined with factors such as differences of language, culture and religious practices, serious ethnic discrimination, and restrictions on free movement, in order to make a living, most rural Uyghurs have had to migrate, whether “spontaneously” within “Xinjiang” (as agrarian laborers or to enter low-end non-agricultural industries) or through the government’s mandatory “transfer of labor”. In either case, they have had to face extreme exploitation and oppression involving ethnic discrimination, social segregation, harsh treatment, lack of security, and loss of rights. They have thus similarly become victims of “state-instigated forced labor”. In this section, I compare rural Palestinians in the West Bank since the Israeli occupation with Uyghur ruralites since the Reform and Opening, presenting the structural similarities and differences in the forced labor they have been subjected to outside the camps.

I. Appropriation and Dispossession of Indigenous Land

Forced labor has often been accompanied by the dispossession of indigenous people’s land. This is fatal for rural populations, as land had been the means of production on which their livelihood depended.

In the case of rural Palestinians in the Seam Zone, Vickery uses the example of a village called Al-Walaja to expose in detail how the Israeli colonizers have been encroaching on their land step by step. After the Palestinian Nakba (“Disaster”) in 1948, when the villagers were forced to flee their homes, at first they thought the war would be over soon, so they moved to a place nearby the village in order to continue farming their land. After the Six Day War in 1967, however, Israel quickly

入自然保护区。如此一来，巴勒斯坦农民就彻底失去了耕地和传统的谋生手段。另外，以色列也为企业和工厂提供优惠，鼓励其开设到犹太定居点。再加上以色列设下的种种限制（将于下一部分展开），巴勒斯坦农民最终不得不接受定居点工作（settlement work），为殖民者干活。即便这被巴勒斯坦权力机构视作违法行为，且常被经济条件较好的同族视作殖民者的走狗，也让工人厌恶自己。

相比之下，汉人对“新疆”原住民土地的占有和剥夺则由（准）军事占领和资本圈地两方面完成。早在1954年，汉人为主的准军事实新疆生产建设兵团成立。兵团一开始主要驻扎在“北疆”，一边开垦土地抢占水源，一边大量接收汉人移民。因此兵团也被维吾尔学者伊力哈木·土赫提直接比作犹太人定居点。据统计，从1954年至1966年期间，兵团就从不到8万公顷的耕地开垦到了81万；兵团人口亦从1954年的18万增加到了1966年的149万。到了改革开放后，官僚资本主义取代了官僚社会主义，同时“新疆”也开始实行土地承包制。另外，中央政府还推出了“西部开发”政策，在“新疆”大力发展“一黑一白”产业：石油和棉花。随着交通网络的完善，许多汉人在政策鼓励下从内地带着资金来南“疆”开荒，并大面积承包土地，以种植棉花为主。据汉人学者李晓霞介绍，虽然维吾尔农民同样开荒，但ta们要么没有资金大规模承包和改造垦地，要么因为繁重的强制性义务工（hashar）无力耕作。相比之下，汉人农民则可通过交钱来免除义务工，汉人承包商甚至还能通过贿赂村干部来获得土地承包权。另外，在“五个统一”的官僚计划经济制下，当地政府还通过指定种植品种、低价收购、各种税费，层层剥削当地农民，极度压低了农耕收益。面对剥削，经济条件相对差的维吾尔农民往往更加脆弱。以上种种都让缺乏资本、技术和社会资源的维吾尔农民难以和汉人竞争。最终，ta们中的许多人不得不将土地（至少部分）承包出去，令“南疆”的土地大量集中到了当地官员和汉人承包商手中。除了资本圈地，随着“南疆”城镇化推进，当地政府也从城郊乡村的维吾尔农民手上大量征地。无论何种原因，土地剥夺都让本就赤贫的维吾尔农民进一步沦为无产者——“农牧区剩余劳动力”。

另一方面，1991年苏联解体后，中共越发警惕“新疆”的“分裂主义”。在这种背景下，大量失业的维吾尔人被视作不稳定因素，亟需提供就业来稳定政局。此外，高速发展的“新疆”棉花产业、东部的沿海工业也需要大量廉价劳动力。这些因素让中国政府开始以“脱贫”为名，将维吾尔“农牧区剩余劳动力”大规模转移到内地的血汗工厂和“新疆”的棉花工厂。此举不仅看似缓解了少数民族就业问题，给汉人资本输送了廉价劳动力，还通过抢占能源与控制人力进一步巩固对“新疆”的经济殖民。这种官商勾结的“脱贫”项目可谓一石三鸟，被维吾尔研究者尼若拉·艾勒玛（Nyrola Elimä）直言是“奴隶贩卖”。除了被迫劳务输出的维吾尔人，还有部分维吾尔

in “Xinjiang” is strikingly similar. Despite the fact that Chinese law stipulates that ethnic minorities should enjoy fair employment rights, almost every industry advertises “Han only” (and Uyghurs earn less than Han workers even if they are in the same industry). This is true for the government, the Corps, state-owned enterprises, and private companies. High-tech, industrial, and energy industries exclude Uyghurs. This leaves Uyghurs traveling from the south to the big cities in the north the single option of looking for work in low-paying sectors such as services and restaurants. It should be emphasized that this ethnic segregation in the labor market has nothing to do with educational attainment. Instead, employment discrimination has led Uyghurs to believe that going to school is useless. According to Tohti, only 15 percent of Uyghur university graduates are employed. In order to find employment, many university students have to work in factories or start small businesses (such as street stalls).


The same is true in Palestine. Palestine has nearly the highest literacy rate in the world, yet more than half of its university graduates are unemployed. And in “Xinjiang”, the doors to upward mobility are closed and ethnic unemployment is high. This has even pushed many Uyghurs into crime. For example, after the 1980s, many Uyghur children were abducted and sold by their peers to become thieves in China proper, and a large number of Uyghurs went to Yunnan to sell drugs. This phenomenon, in turn, made the uninformed Han in China proper resentful of Uyghurs, deepening misunderstandings and ethnic conflicts.

It can be seen that the colonial ruling class segregated the labor market by race/ethnicity, whether by means of the work permit system or employment discrimination. As Vickery argues, the labor market was divided by race/ethnicity into a primary labor market and a secondary labor market: the primary labor market (high-income industries and high-level jobs) was reserved for the colonizers (Jewish/Han settlers), and the secondary labor market (low-income industries and bottom-level jobs) was reserved for the colonized (Palestinians/Uyghurs).[53] This is why Tohti says that the urban-rural dichotomy in China proper is equivalent to the Han-Uyghur dichotomy in “Xinjiang.”

In a nutshell, whether it is Israel or the CCP, the colonial ruling class, by depriving the indigenous people of their land and blocking all ways out, has proletarianized the colonized ethnic group and ultimately forced it to be “voluntarily” slaughtered by colonial capital. In this extreme case, even without direct coercion from the state apparatus, the colonized people have no choice but to survive. Thus, rural Palestinians and Uyghurs essentially share the same conditions of being forced to work. The intensification of ethnic tensions caused by prolonged settler colonization and ethnic segregation has led Uyghur and Han scholars to compare “Xinjiang” to Palestine and South Africa.

可以看到，无论是以工作证制度还是就业歧视，殖民统治阶级都将劳动力市场进行了种/民族隔离。如同维克里所言，劳动市场按种/民族被划分为主要劳动力市场和次要劳动力市场：主要劳动力市场（高收入行业和高层岗位）留给殖民者（犹太人/汉人），次要劳动力市场（低收入行业和与底层岗位）留给被殖民者（巴勒斯坦人/维吾尔人）。[43]这也是为何土赫提会说，中国内地的城乡二元社会恰好是“新疆”的汉维民族之别。

概言之，无论是以色列还是中共，殖民统治阶级都通过剥夺原住民土地，封堵一切出路，让被殖民的民族无产化，最终不得不“自愿”被殖民资本宰割。这种极端情况下，即便没有国家机器的直接胁迫，被殖民者为了生存也别无选择。因此，巴勒斯坦农民和维吾尔农民在本质上共享着同一种强迫劳动。长期的定居者殖民和民族隔离所造成的民族矛盾激烈化，更是让维汉学者把“新疆”类比巴勒斯坦、南非。



annexed the West Bank. It established outposts, houses for settlers, and a network of roads connecting Israel to the West Bank running through and around the village. Then, in 2002, after the Second Intifada, Israel's border wall enclosed the village within "Area C" under direct Israeli control. Even the residents' newly built villages and recently cultivated farmland were incorporated into Israel's nature reserves under the pretext of "land conservation". As a result, Palestinian villagers were completely deprived of their arable land and their traditional means of livelihood. In addition, Israel provided incentives for businesses and factories to open in the Jewish settlements. When this was coupled with the restrictions imposed by Israel (discussed in the next section), rural Palestinians were eventually forced to accept jobs working on the settlements for the colonizers. While accepting such jobs is considered illegal by the Palestinian Authority, and some of their better-off compatriots regard the workers as colonial lackeys, many of the workers themselves have also expressed disgust about having to stoop this low.

In comparison, Han occupation and dispossession of indigenous land in "Xinjiang" has been accomplished through both (para-)military occupation and capital enclosure. As early as 1954, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, a Han-dominated paramilitary entity, was established. The Corps was initially based primarily in Dzungaria [the northern half of Xinjiang], where it reclaimed land and seized water while accepting large numbers of Han settlers. For this reason, Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti has compared the Corps directly to the Israeli settlements in Palestine. According to statistics, between 1954 and 1966, the Corps expanded the region's land under cultivation from 80,000 hectares to 810,000, and the Corp's population grew from 180,000 to 1,490,000. After the Reform and Opening, bureaucratic capitalism replaced bureaucratic socialism, and the "Household Responsibility System" [where villages were required to divide collectively-owned farmland and allot its use-rights to households] (土地承包制) was introduced to "Xinjiang". In addition, the central government launched its "Western Development" (西部开发) policy [in phases throughout the 2000s], which vigorously developed "black and white" industries in the region: oil and cotton. With the improvement of the transportation network, many Han were encouraged by the policy to bring money from China proper to the south of "Xinjiang" to rent (承包) large tracts of land and bring it under cultivation, mainly for growing cotton. According to Han scholar Li Xiaoxia, although rural Uyghurs also farmed, they either did not have the funds to rent and reclaim land on such a large scale, or were unable to do so because of the burdensome corvée (义务工) system [i.e. mandatory labor for the local state on public works projects, known by Uyghurs as] hashar. By contrast, Han ruralites can be exempted from corvée by paying money, and Han contractors (承包商) can even bribe village cadres to obtain the right to use land (土地承包权). In addition, under the bureaucratic system³² of "the five unifieds" (五个统一) [in the early 2000s, during the agrarian phase of Xinjiang's capitalist transition], local governments exploited smallholding farmers through the designation of planting varieties, low purchasing prices, and various taxes and fees, which greatly reduced the farmers' agricultural income. In the face of such exploitation, rural Uyghurs have tended to become more vulnerable. All of the above have made it difficult for Uyghur ruralites, who lack capital, technology, and social resources, to compete with Han farmers. Eventually, many of them had to contract

劳动力是自发选择外出打工。然而无论被迫还是自发，两者都面临着同样的高度剥削就业环境，区别只不过是前者还遭到了一定程度的胁迫（在再教育营还未出现以前）。实际上，并非所有外出务工者（含被强制转移的）都家中无地，失地亦非（强制）转移的先决条件。但土地的重要性万万不可忽视。因为对于有地者而言，一方面政府会拿没收土地作威胁，迫使其接受转移；另一方面往往自己难以凭借少量土地，继续在汉人资本的围剿下以传统农耕为生。这种土地剥夺一直延续至今，且越发强硬暴力，愈演愈烈。



Images of a detention facility built in Shawan County, 19 December 2020. accessed on Google Earth

（二）封堵一切生路

维克里进一步剖析，强迫劳动光靠剥夺生产资料（土地）完全不够。要想让被殖民者被任意摆布，殖民国家还须将被殖民者与所有更好的工作机会进行隔离，令其只能接受殖民资本的支配。这种隔离包括了物理和经济两个层面。

物理上，限制原住民劳动力的自由移动：

以色列殖民者将西岸划分为A、B、C三区，并直接管理了面积占60%的C区。每个区都由大大小小的零碎飞地组成，彼此互不连通。此外，以色列还建了隔离墙，设立了大量路障、前哨点和检查站。这种掠夺并碎片化原住民土地、实行种族隔离制的过程，也被称为巴勒斯坦的“班图斯坦化”。加上许多道路仅限以色列人使用、道路常被以方突然封

In addition to physically restricting the movement of rural Palestinians, Israel uses the building permit system to limit their possibilities for self-development. In Area C (the area of the Seam Zone), Palestinians need Israeli approval to build anything—even a small chicken farm. In reality, the likelihood of obtaining permission is negligible. In 2023, Palestinian applications for building in Area C were rejected at a rate of 95%, while settler applications were overwhelmingly approved. Even if one takes the risk of building a small workshop privately, it will be demolished if discovered by the Israelis. As Mohammed, a villager from Alwalaga who works in the settlement, says: “If I had a chance to start my own business, build a project, I would do it. But this is Area [the area of the West Bank under complete Israeli military control]. I can’t create anything.” In addition to restricting the self-development of the original inhabitants, Israel has, through various means, imposed a total economic stranglehold on the areas under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority (Areas A and B.) After the Paris Accords of 1994, the Israeli currency, the shekel, became the main currency of exchange in the West Bank; Israel has full control over the import and export of Palestinian goods; and even the Palestinian Authority’s tax revenues are collected under Israel’s responsibility. This all-encompassing stranglehold has made it difficult for the Palestinian urban economy to grow healthily, and the labor market naturally has seen supply far outstrip demand. As a result, the high unemployment rate has discouraged Palestinian farmers from moving to the cities.

In the rural areas of “Xinjiang”, as mentioned earlier, not only to Uyghur farmers lack any control or competitiveness in agricultural production, they even have to give away their land. In the energy sector, the enormous power and lucrative profits from local oil and gas development are even more firmly held in the hands of the Han bureaucracy, and the Uyghurs are not allowed to get their hands on any of it. According to statistics, the “West-East Gas Pipeline” project alone provides the “Xinjiang” government with more than one billion yuan in tax revenues each year. If these resources were autonomously developed by Uyghur farmers and workers in a democratic manner, they might be able to solve their employment problems more efficiently and develop their economy more equally, and at the same time avoid the environmental damage caused by over-exploitation by Han capitalists, and would not have to “rely” on so-called “poverty alleviation” projects or gather in low-income sectors. In addition, the Uyghur bourgeoisie, which could have provided some impetus to the development of [an independent Uyghur] “ethnic economy” (民族经济) and job opportunities for compatriots, has been subjected to a long history of repression: many entrepreneurs have either been arrested, as in the case of Rebiya Kadeer, or have had their property confiscated. Moderate intellectuals such as Tohti have been heavily silenced and even imprisoned. As a result, Uyghurs’ attempts to develop an independent economy have become a fool’s errand.

The most crucial aspect is the strict division of the labor market according to race/ethnicity. In the case of Israeli colonizers, this division was accomplished through the work permit system. In order to work legally in Israel or in Israeli settlements, Palestinian workers must first obtain a work permit approved by Israel. The work permit system also limits Palestinian workers to agriculture, construction and services. Most of these industries have poor working conditions and low pay, making it difficult to recruit Israeli Jews. Meanwhile, the management of businesses is dominated by settlers. The situation

展，以色列还通过各种手段对巴勒斯坦权力机构管辖区（A、B区）进行全面经济宰制。1994年的《巴黎协议》后，以色列货币谢克尔成为西岸的主要交易货币；以色列全面控制巴勒斯坦的商品进出口；甚至巴勒斯坦权力机构的税收都是以色列负责收的。这种全方位的绞杀让巴勒斯坦城市经济难以健康发展，劳动力市场自然也就供远大于求。于是，高企的失业率更令巴勒斯坦农民对城市望而却步。

在“新疆”农村，就像前文提到的，维吾尔农民对农业生产不仅没有任何掌控力和竞争力，甚至不得不将自己的土地拱手让人。能源方面，当地石油天然气等能源开发的巨大权力和丰厚利润更是被汉人官僚集团牢牢攥在手里，不由维吾尔人染指分毫。据统计，每年光是“西气东输”项目便为“新疆”政府提供了十亿税收。^[37]倘若这些资源都能由维吾尔农民和工人民主决策地自主开发，他们恐怕自己就能更有效地解决就业，更平等地发展经济，同时还可能避免汉人资本家过度开发造成的环境破坏，无须“依赖”所谓的“脱贫”项目或聚集在低收入行业。另外，本能一定程度带动民族经济发展、为族人同胞提供工作机会的维吾尔资产阶级也长期遭受打压：许多企业家不是像热比娅·卡德尔一样被抓捕，便是财产被没收。^[38]土赫提等温和派知识分子更是被大量噤声乃至监禁。这样一来，维吾尔人想发展独立的民族经济无疑痴人说梦。

最关键的一环，则是对劳动力市场按照种/民族进行严格划分。对于以色列殖民者，这种划分是通过工作证制度完成的。要想在以色列或以色列定居点合法务工，巴勒斯坦工人必须先得到以色列审批的工作证。工作证制度还规定了巴勒斯坦工人只能从事农业、建筑业和服务业。这些行业大多工作条件差、报酬低，难以招到以色列犹太人。同时，企业管理层则由定居者霸占。“新疆”的情况也是惊人相似。尽管中国法律规定少数民族应享有公平的就业权利，但几乎各行各业都赤裸裸地在招聘广告上写了“只招汉人”（即便同行业中维吾尔人也比汉人收入低）。无论政府、兵团、国企、私企，皆如此。高科技行业、工业和能源行业更是将维吾尔人排除在外。这让从南“疆”到北“疆”大城市找工作的维吾尔人只能聚集在服务业、餐饮业等低收入行业。需要强调的是，这种劳动力市场的民族隔离和受教育程度高低没有关系。就业歧视反而还让维吾尔人产生“读书无用论”的想法。土赫提统计，维吾尔大学毕业生的就业率仅15%。为了就业，许多大学生不得不去工厂打工，或是做小本生意（如摆地摊）。在巴勒斯坦亦是如此。巴勒斯坦有近乎全世界最高的识字率，却有超过一半的大学毕业生找不到工作。而在“新疆”，向上流动的大门紧闭、民族失业率高企，甚至把许多维吾尔人挤到了犯罪道路。例如，80年代后有许多维吾尔儿童被同族拐卖至内地当小偷，大量维吾尔人跑到云南贩毒。这种现象又进而令不明就里的内地汉人对维吾尔人产生反感，加深了误解与民族矛盾。

out their land (at least partially). This has led to a large concentration of “Southern Xinjiang’s” land into the hands of local officials and Han contractors. In addition to capital enclosure, as urbanization has progressed in the region, local governments have also expropriated large amounts of land from rural Uyghurs in suburban villages. Whatever the specific mechanisms may have been, the expropriation of land has further proletarianized rural Uyghurs who had already been poor to begin with, reducing them to “surplus labor-power from the agrarian and pastoral areas” (农牧区剩余劳动力)。

Meanwhile, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the CCP became increasingly wary of “separatism” in “Xinjiang”. Against this backdrop, the large number of unemployed Uyghurs was seen as a destabilizing factor, and employment was urgently needed to stabilize the political situation. In addition, the fast-growing cotton industry in “Xinjiang” and the coastal industries in eastern China also required large numbers of cheap laborers. These factors led the Chinese government to begin a massive transfer of Uyghur “surplus labor-power from agrarian and pastoral areas” to sweatshops in China proper and to cotton factories in “Xinjiang” in the name of “poverty alleviation”. While this program was presented as mitigating the employment problem of ethnic minorities and delivering cheap labor to Han capital, it also served to consolidate the economic colonization of “Xinjiang” by seizing energy and controlling the workforce—thus killing three birds with one stone through the collusion of government and business (官商勾结). The program has been described by Uyghur researcher Nyrola Elimä as a “slave trade.” In addition to those Uyghurs whose labor-power is exported by force, others voluntarily look for jobs away from their hometowns. Whether forced or voluntary, however, both face the same highly exploitative employment environment, with the difference being that the former have also been subjected to a certain degree of coercion (even before the advent of the new type of re-education camps). In fact, not all migrant workers (including those who are forcibly transferred) are landless, and landlessness is not a prerequisite for (forced) transfer. But the importance of land cannot be ignored. For those who have land, on the one hand, the government will threaten to confiscate their land to force them to accept the transfer; on the other hand, it is often difficult for them to continue to make a living through traditional farming with a small amount of land under the threat of Han capital. This kind of land dispossession continues to this day, becoming more and more forceful and violent, and more and more intense.

II. Blocking All Paths of Life

Vickery further dissects that forced labor is not enough to deprive the means of production (land). In order for the colonized to be at the mercy of the colonial power, the latter must also isolate the former from better job opportunities and make them subject only to the dictates of colonial capital. This segregation has both physical and economic dimensions.

(1) Physically, the Imposition of Limits upon the Free Movement of Indigenous Labor-Power

The Israeli colonizers divided the West Bank into Areas A, B and C, with 60 percent of the latter area being directly administered by Israel. Each area consisted of small and large fragmented enclaves that were disconnected from each other. In addition, Israel had built the separation wall and established numerous roadblocks,

锁，C区的巴勒斯坦人到A、B区城市务工的交通成本远远高于到定居点的。正如维克里举的例子：“一个南希伯伦山（笔者注：属于C区）的木工或许能在仅26英里（笔者注：相当于42公里）外的拉马拉的一个木料间找到工作，但有了以色列限制移动、检查站、道路系统，去那里一趟要花几小时……”况且，搜身还常带有羞辱和暴力，冲突爆发时人身安全也受威胁。这些因素都让接缝区的巴勒斯坦农民难以到城市务工，不得不将目光投向定居点工作。

而在“新疆”，维吾尔农民迁移同样受限。维吾尔经济学家伊力哈木·土赫提就曾分析：“以封闭、相互隔绝的绿洲孤岛为主要特征的特殊地理环境”，令维吾尔人难以从主要栖居地——偏远欠发达的“南疆”农村——转移到高度工业化的汉人聚集地：“天山北坡经济带”。维吾尔学者阿布都外力·依米提也指出，“新疆”距中国内地的路途远、成本高、乡村道路建设差，这些都令维吾尔农村劳动力难以像内地汉人农民工一样到内地打工。除了自然地理因素，还有语言的隔阂、文化宗教的迥异、民族歧视等社会因素。因此，尽管80年代中期以后有少数“社会经验较丰富、社会关系较多”的维吾尔人外出经商并取得成功（以开餐馆、做贸易为主），大部分维吾尔农村的剩余劳动力只能在“疆”内转移当农工，或是到周边镇上或乌鲁木齐等“新疆”大城市打工。据2001年数据统计，“新疆”农村约有180万剩余劳动力（约占当地农村劳动力的44%），却仅有2万人外出打工（仅占农村剩余劳动力的1%），而99%的转移劳动力都在“疆”内就业。这一点也可以在王力雄2003年“新疆”考察记录中得到印证：“【‘新疆’】汉族青年至少还可以去内地打工，当地民族青年只能在家。”

到了2009年的“七五事件”后，高压维稳政策更是令维吾尔人的移动亦处处受到监控和限制：街上同样密布的检查站；身份证和民族身份挂钩；出“疆”需当地警察批准；即便到了外地都难以入住酒店或租到房；居住登记表只有汉语；极难获得护照等等。重重阻碍令维吾尔农民人更加寸步难行，进一步加剧了其失业情况。

经济上，绞杀原住民独立经济，对劳动力市场进行种/民族隔离：

以色列除了在物理上限制巴勒斯坦农民的移动，还利用建筑许可制度限制其自我发展的可能性。在C区（即接缝区所属区），巴勒斯坦人若想建任何东西（哪怕是小小的鸡舍），都需要得到以色列的批准。但事实上获得批准的可能性微乎其微。2023年，巴勒斯坦人的C区建筑申请拒绝率高达95%，而定居者的申请绝大部分都能通过。即便是冒着风险私下兴建小作坊，一旦被以方发现就会被拆毁。正如在定居点务工的“阿尔瓦拉加村民穆哈迈德（Mohammed）所说：“但凡我有一丝机会能做自己的生意、搞个项目，我都会做的。但这里是C区……我什么业都创不了。”除了限制原住民自我发

outposts and checkpoints. This process of land grabbing and fragmentation of indigenous lands and the imposition of apartheid is also known as the “Bantustanization” of Palestine. Combined with the fact that many roads are restricted to Israelis and are often closed abruptly by Israel, the cost of transportation for Palestinians from Area C to work in cities in Areas A and B is much higher than in settlements. As Vickery notes: “A talented carpenter in the south of Hebron Hills [in Area C] may fit the bill for a job at a lumberyard in Ramallah, only 26 miles away, but with Israeli restrictions on movement, checkpoints, and the road system, the journey to get there would take hours.” Moreover, body searches are often accompanied by humiliation and violence, and personal safety is threatened when conflict erupts. These factors make it difficult for Palestinian farmers in the Seam Zone to work in the cities, and they are forced to look to the settlements for work.

In “Xinjiang”, Uyghur farmers are also restricted in their migration. Uyghur economist Ilham Tohti has analyzed that “the special geographic environment, characterized by closed, isolated oases,” makes it difficult for Uyghurs to move from their main habitat, the remote and underdeveloped rural areas of “Southern Xinjiang,” to the highly industrialized Han settlement known as the “Economic Belt on the Northern Slope of the Tianshan Range” (天山北坡经济带). Uyghur scholar Abduweli Yimiti also points out that the long distances, high costs, and poorly constructed roads in the countryside make it harder for rural Uyghurs to migrate to China proper for work than it is for their Han counterparts. In addition to natural geographic factors, there are also social factors such as language barriers, cultural and religious differences, and ethnic discrimination. Therefore, although a few Uyghurs with “richer social experience and more social connections” (社会经验较丰富、社会关系较多) have gone out to do business after the mid-1980s and have succeeded in doing so (mainly by opening restaurants and trading), most of the surplus laborers in the Uyghur countryside can only move within “Xinjiang” to work as agricultural laborers, or to work in neighboring towns or large cities, such as Urumqi. According to 2001 statistics, there were approximately 1.8 million surplus laborers in the rural areas of “Xinjiang” (about 44% of the local rural labor force), but only 20,000 of them went out to work (only 1% of the rural surplus labor force), and 99% of the transferred laborers worked within “Xinjiang.” This can also be seen in the fact that 99% of the transferred labor force is employed within the “border”. This is also evidenced by Wang Lixiong’s account of his 2003 visit to “Xinjiang”: “[Xinjiang’s] Han youth can at least go to China proper to work, while the local ethnic youth can only stay at home. They can only stay at home.”

After the July 5 incident of 2009, the high-pressure stabilization policy has made it even more difficult to monitor and restrict the movement of Uyghurs: checkpoints on the streets are equally dense; identity cards are linked to ethnicity; permission from the local police is required to travel outside of “Xinjiang”; it is difficult to stay in a hotel or rent a room in China proper; residence registration forms are in Chinese only; it is extremely difficult to obtain a passport, and so on. These obstacles make it even more difficult for rural Uyghurs to move around, further exacerbating their unemployment.

(2) Economically, the Strangulation of Independent Indigenous Economies and the Racial/Ethnic Segregation of the Labor Market